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Gestures are potential authentication method for touchscreen devices and common tasks such as phone 
lock. While many studies have indicated gesture passwords can achieve high usability, evaluating their 
security remains a grey area. Key challenges stem from the small sample sizes in current gesture 
password studies and the requirement to use similarity-based recognition metrics which prevent the 
application of traditional entropy assessment methods. To overcome these problems, we perform a 
large-scale study online (N=2594). With the resulting data set, we develop a novel multi-stage 
discretization method and n-gram Markov models that enable us to assess the partial guessing entropy 
of gesture passwords and to create a novel clustering-based dictionary attack. We report then while 
partial guessing entropy appears to be greater than other common phone lock methods (e.g., Pin, 
pattern), gestures are highly susceptible to dictionary attack. To improve the security of gesture 
passwords, we develop a novel gesture password strength meter. Password strength meters has been 
previously proposed as an effective password policy that can improve the security of other 
authentication techniques such as passwords or pattern. Using the meter, we propose various mandated 
compliances in which users are restricted to meet certain level of strength: default (none), weak, fair, 
and strong. We validate the effectiveness of gesture strength meter designs on security by performing 
a follow up online study and applying the security framework and attacks established in the first study. 
The default policy improves the gesture password security with small cost in usability. This thesis 
concludes that gesture password meters can be an effective technique for improving the security of 
gesture authentication systems that deserve further study.
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Users commonly choose simple and memorable passwords for unlocking their mobile devices whether 
it is PINs [1] or patterns [2]. Although fast and simple authentication can be highly usable, a malicious 
user may successfully crack such easy-to-guess passwords to assess private information. Gesture 
passwords are hand-drawn graphical passwords on touch screen devices and may serve as a potential 
alternative password scheme compensating security issues for several reasons: the theoretical space of 
possible gestures is extremely large compared to PINs or patterns [3] and authenticating with gesture 
passwords may require less visual attention [4] which is an attractive feature for mobile usage scenarios.   
Despite gesture password’s expected potentials, evaluation of the innate security and usability of 
gesture password is currently ambiguous. First of all, recent studies evaluating security of gesture 
password have collected small numbers of gesture samples in lab studies [5][6]. This contrasts to large 
scale data collection studies conducted with other password schemes such as PINs [7] and patterns [8]. 
Moreover, no common metrics have been established to assess the security of gesture passwords. This 
uncertainty makes comparison with other password schemes challenging. Currently, collecting large 
gesture data sets is necessary to establish appropriate evaluation metrics. Finally, current gesture studies 
lack password composition policies which can guide users toward secure password selections [9]. 
Nowadays, a number of websites adopt password strength meters to encourage users creating strong 
text passwords [10]. This is not the only case for text passwords, as prior study of pattern policies [8] 
also verify the effectiveness of policies such as mandating the start point during password creation. 
To overcome uncertainties in evaluating security of gesture passwords, we conduct a large scale online 
study collecting 2594 gestures from online workers. We then establish two effective gesture password 
security evaluation methods: partial guessing entropy assessment and clustering based dictionary attack. 
To calculate partial guessing entropy of gesture data, we propose a novel multi-stage discretization 
method which enables raw gestures to be used to train n-gram Markov models. To minimize error, we 
explore out n-gram Markov model parameters such as smoothing methods and edge case handling to 
select the best performing model. We construct 270 models using a 5-fold process and select the optimal 
models based on three reasonable criteria: Crack rate, Similarity, and Completeness. We show how 
gesture password considerably outperforms other password schemes regarding partial guessing entropy 
analysis with our optimal n-gram Markov models. In contrast to the high entropy, we also show a large 
proportion of collected gesture passwords are cracked with our effective clustering-based dictionary 
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attack (54.18% to 58.37%). In light of weakness against the guessing attack, we develop novel password 
strength meters for gesture which can guide users toward more secure passwords [10][11]. To 
accurately measure a gesture password’s strength, simple heuristics like password length and number 
of non-overlapping symbols are combined with advanced measures such as probability and dictionary 
match score. We diversify the designed meter by mandating compliance with a minimum strength of 
gesture password: default(none), weak, fair, and strong. We show mandating compliance improves 
security against our dictionary guessing attack by 12% to 60%. We observe how mandating compliance 
negatively affects usability reducing recall performance by between 8% and 11%.   
The contributions of this work are: 
1) Effective gesture discretization method and diverse n-gram Markov models. 
2) Security framework of partial guessing entropy assessment for gestures. 
3) Novel gesture meter design improving the security of user-chosen gesture password. 
 
1.2 Thesis statement  
 
Gesture meters derived from large datasets of gesture password examples can be used as effective 
password composition policies. They can improve the security of gesture passwords for phone lock with 
acceptable costs to usability. 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
  
This thesis is composed of five sections, the first being this introduction. In the second section, the 
background and related work are presented, covering gesture passwords and password strength meters. 
In the third section, we summarize the procedure of a large online study for collecting gesture password 
data on smartphones. We also introduce a security evaluation process via n-gram Markov model based 
partial guessing entropy assessment and a clustering based online guessing attack. In the fourth section, 
we explain how we develop a gesture password meter and how varying the compliance policy with that 
meter affects security and usability, as measured in a small-scale online study. In the final section, we 
present discussions and conclusions of this thesis. 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Gesture passwords 
2.1.1 Gesture 
 As advances in touch screen devices allows high resolution input over large areas, suggestions for new 
authentication techniques to protect users’ information in their devices have been proposed [12].  Early 
work mainly explores authentication with gestures and inputs on the touch screen. This involves 
exploring robust and identifiable gestures [13] and successfully authenticating genuine users with single 
stroke approaches [14]. Prior gesture studies have also explored full-screen and multi stroke gesture 
inputs over various touch screen devices, while we note gesture passwords studies are yet to consider 
the smartphone usage scenario where input area is limited, and only single-stroke gesture passwords 
are allowed such as Android patterns. While the main focus of very early work was on exploring 
performance of gestures to be used as authentication system, recent gesture works highlight 
performance of recognizers, usability and security of gestures as a new authentication technique.  
 
2.1.2 Gesture recognizer 
Recognizing two relevant gesture passwords is usually more difficult than the case of text or PIN 
passwords where two passwords are matched exactly with their contents. Gesture passwords should be 
matched based on stroke similarity. Dynamic Time Warping is one candidate for recognizing gestures 
with excellent performance in assessing similarity between time series data [15] whose effectiveness in 
graphics has been explored [16]. Another well-established gesture recognizer is Protractor which uses 
cosine distance as similarity measure [17].  Although many recognizers have been proposed widely 
across the literature, variations in recognizers performance [5] often make gesture password analysis 






2.1.3 Gesture usability and security 
For the most part, researchers have analyzed passwords on usability and security to determine their 
effectiveness over other password schemes. Yang et al. [18] examine usability and memorability of 
user-chosen gesture passwords after one hour, one day, and one week compared with text passwords 
over multiple user accounts. According to their result, gesture password outperforms usability in terms 
of creation time (42%) and entry time (22%) and similar degree of memorability compared to text 
passwords. Sherman el al. [3] and Sahami et al. [19] perform shoulder-surfing attacks in which a 
malicious observer attacks a user’s gesture password to assess the security of gesture passwords, while 
Liu et al. [5] perform automated brute-force attack generating random frequencies and applying low 
pass filter. Compared to rather simple guessing attacks such as brute-force attack and shoulder-surfing 
attack, a recent gesture study [6] successfully cracks between 47.71% and 55.9% of gesture password 
data set with novel dictionary based offline guessing attack with 109guesses. The study generates an 
envelope known as Sakoe-Chiba band around dictionary gestures and guesses gesture by creating attack 
gestures within the band. We note here that guessing attacks with common and guessable gestures (i.e. 
star shape) are potentially effective. 
 
2.2 Password Improvement Methods 
 
2.2.1 Password composition policy 
Designing a password composition policy is important, as it helps users to avoid guessable password 
[9] by mandating minimum requirements. However, it is important to notice when designing password 
composition policies that they may impact usability [20] by making it more difficult for users to recall 
or enter their passwords [9][21]. While numerous studies examine policies for text passwords such as 
minimum required password length and number of symbols [10][22], few studies regarding password 
policy are currently available for graphical passwords. Cho et al. [8] mandate composition points and 
explores the impact in terms of security and usability for Android pattern. Chen et al. [23] apply 
password meter to Android pattern to guide users creating secure passwords. They strengthen the 
security of pattern passwords by providing visual feedback, while highlighting issues in usability. Clark 
et al. [24] propose three policies that request users to create gestures that are fast, random or use multiple 
fingers. Evaluations indicate they have limited impact on security and may have negatively affected 
usability. Given the importance of password policies in ensuring the security of other forms of password 
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system, we identify the need for research on the development of policies that can help users select more 
secure gesture passwords. 
 
2.2.2 Strength estimation 
Password meter (PSM) is an effective policy that can measure the strength of password and provide 
informative feedback visually to users [10]. Egelman et al. [11] emphasize the effectiveness of password 
meter on security in a compulsory scenario. Most importantly, meters should correctly measure the 
strength of entered passwords [25]. Heuristics such as password length, number of non-overlapping 
symbols, use of upper and lower case and use of special characters [10][21][26] are commonly used to 
measure the password strength. Ur et al. [10] examine various meter designs and conclude users choose 
longer password when a meter is presented compared to a baseline condition. Recent studies suggest 
that simple heuristics are ambiguous to measure true password strength [7][26][27]. Recent work by Ur 
et al. [22] uses an artificial neural network to score passwords with multiple heuristics. Castellucia et 
al. base n-gram Markov model [28] and Houshmand et al. apply Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar 
(PCGF) to examine the password strength [29]. For graphical password Chen et al. apply password 
meter to pattern to estimate the strength of pattern [23].  Galbally et al. introduce multimodal approaches 
and fused measure to successfully score a password [30]. While many studies struggle measuring the 
accurate password strength with diverse approaches, we note no current studies exist for measuring the 
gesture password strength. Limited number of works on graphical password meter is done by Chen et 
al. applying password meter on Android pattern [23]. We note applying password meter to gesture 
passwords has not been explored and password meter for gestures can be a valuable security strategy 
as users are new to gesture password and do not know if their passwords are strong.
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III. LARGE SCALE ONLINE STUDY 
  
In this section, we establish security evaluation metrics for gesture passwords performing large scale 
online data collection study. We also describe a clustering based online guessing attack and a process 
for selection of a probabilistic model for calculation of partial guessing entropy. Together these 
techniques can assess the strength of gesture password set. 
  
3.1. Security evaluation techniques 
  
3.1.1 Preprocessing and recognition metric  
It is always essential for gestures to be normalized correctly in advance of any security analysis. The 
variabilities of two gestures involving size, location, and orientation make comparison difficult 
otherwise. Previous works suggest preprocessing procedures by exploring the impact of applying scale, 
location, and rotation normalization that makes these properties invariant [5]. For instance, the two 
gestures depicting similar arrows in the same stroke order should be matched regardless of differences 
in the scale or location. However, the rotation normalization is typically not applied as we regard a 
gesture depicting a leftward arrow as different from one depicting a rightward arrow. 
The next step involves selection of appropriate gesture recognition metric to assess gesture similarity. 
While there are many existing algorithms for gesture recognition, Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) 
[6][16] and Protractor [3][18] which have been widely used in recent gesture works and are applied as 
recognition metrics in this study. In this study, these recognizers were configured as described below. 
DTW: Standard DTW implementation based on a Euclidean distance measure is used [16]. To optimize 
DTW, we set global constraint as Sakoe-Chiba band with 10% band size of sequence length. Global 
constraint speeds up the algorithm by setting boundary to search region. We follow 10% window size 
from previous gesture work [6]. 
Protractor: Reference $N Protractor implementation is used [31]. Gestures are compared by inverse 
cosine distance. Recognizer only allows single stroke gestures and allow gestures to be matched on 
shape. We applied default threshold value for rotation invariance. 
The final step is re-sampling. As gesture recognizers require gestures to be exactly the same size, re-
sampling is an essential part of preprocessing procedures. The optimal value for resampling size (n) can 
be determined by creating multiple sets of re-sampled gestures and comparing Equal Error Rates (EERs) 
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as in previous work [6]. For a given data set, False Rejection Rates (FRRs), which measure the 
proportions of users’ genuine gestures that are rejected by a gesture algorithm, are calculated by 
matching different examples of each individual’s gestures against each other. False Acceptance Rates 
(FARs), which measures the proportion of others’ gestures being misclassified as users’ own, are based 
on matching an individual’s stored gesture template against those from all other individuals. FARs 
reflect the rate at which naive attackers might succeed in guessing users’ gestures. By calculating FRRs 
and FARs for a range of distance threshold values, we can derive an EER at their intersection. Re-
sampling size is then set to minimize EERs across the data sets being examined [3]. 
  
3.1.2 Entropy assessment 
The degree of likelihood with which a given user would choose a given gesture password can be a 
significant metric for evaluating password strength - more commonly chosen passwords would be easier 
to guess or predict. This exact probability could be precisely determined from a dataset containing the 
real-world gesture password probability distribution for all passwords. However, in practice, since only 
a small portion of theoretically possible space of gesture passwords can be collected, it is necessary to 
develop probabilistic password models that use collected gesture samples to estimate the full probability 
distribution [32]. Developing n-gram Markov models is one way of achieving this that has been shown 
to be effective at estimating the probability distribution of other forms of graphical passwords [1][8]. 
In an n-gram Markov model, the probability of the next stroke in a graphical password is calculated 
based on a prefix of length n. The idea behind the model is that adjacent strokes in user-chosen 
passwords are not independent but follow certain high probability patterns. In 2-gram Markov model 
(also known as 1-order Markov chain), probability of a password “	𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3	. . . 𝑎$”  can be calculated as 
equation (1), 
 






                                              (2) 
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where 𝑎* represents starting symbol attached to the beginning of every password. Transition probability 
in (1) can be calculated from dataset with equation (2), as 𝑃(𝑎,|𝑎,+1)can be obtained counting 
frequencies of “𝑎,+1𝑎, ” divided by counting frequencies of “𝑎,+1 ”. To accurately estimate the 
probability a gesture using this technique, it is essential to develop a reasonable probabilistic password 
model that approximates the probability distribution of real-world gesture passwords. To achieve this, 
270 2-gram Markov models were built through 5-fold process. The different models varied stroke 
discretization and 2-gram Markov parameters to identify the most appropriate model for further study. 
Higher order n-gram Markov model (e.g. 3-gram) were assessed, as they resulted in a very high 
proportion of unseen n-gram sequences. The multi-stage process used to generate the n-gram Markov 
models and select a reasonable final model are described below. 
Firstly, gestures should be in the form of a sequence of symbols in order to construct n-gram Markov 
model. However, gestures are composed of long a series of coordinates and two gestures with similar 
shapes might also contain quite different number of coordinates. Moreover, it is hard to regard the raw 
coordinates as discrete symbols. As the total number of possible raw coordinates is extremely large, 
effectively precluding use for training a reasonable n-gram Markov model. To solve this problem, we 
apply the Douglas-Peucker (DP) line simplification algorithm to all gestures [33]. DP line simplification 
is a well-defined technique and was selected for its reported accuracy over other candidate algorithms 
[34]. To set appropriate DP tolerance value, we check the relationship between the DP simplification 
tolerance value and the number of simplified strokes on large gesture data set and select the knee point 
as the optimal value [35]. See figure 1 (a) for an example. 
 
                                     
               (a) DP tolerance and simplified points                      (b) Sample simplified gesture 
Fig 1. (a) depicts a typical relationship between tolerance and total simplified points of DP simplification algorithm. The knee 
point is highlighted with a filled dot. (b) shows an example of how an “N” shaped user-chosen gesture password would be 
simplified to three basic strokes by applying the DP simplification algorithm. 
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Using the set of simplified strokes, we generate discrete symbols based on individual stroke length and 
stroke angle. We divide the angle and full range of all observed stroke lengths into equally sized 
segments and classify each simplified stroke into an angle/length category. Each angle/length category 
is associated with a unique symbol. Following this transformation, it is possible to represent each 
gesture as a series of symbols each representing as a single stroke. 
To find a reasonable model, we consider multiple possible divisions of stroke length (dividing the full 
range of all observed strokes lengths into 2, 3, or 4 equally sized length regions) and angle (into 6, 8, 
10, 12 and 14 equally sized angular regions). These variations of length and angle categories were 
chosen to result to sets of between 12 (2 length by 6 angle) and 56 (4 length by 14 angle) symbols, a 
range roughly equivalent to the number of symbols in a pattern (9 points) or PIN (10 symbols) and an 
alphanumeric password (about 95 symbols). To minimize error from the angle discretization process, 
we explore an additional variable: phase. Two possible phases for the angular regions are considered. 
The first aligned phase has its origin at 0◦ and the second offset phase has its origin at half the region 




                                  (a) offset phase                                        (b) aligned phase 
 Fig.2. Example of offset and aligned phases in the angle discretization process. In this example, the length region is divided 





We further propose generating models using a grid search over two n-gram model variables: smoothing 
method and exclusion policy for short gestures. For smoothing, three well-known n-gram smoothing 
methods are applied to each model: 1) “add-1 Laplace smoothing”, 2) “add-1/(number of symbols (N)) 
Laplace smoothing” and 3) “Good-Turing smoothing”. The use of smoothing methods enables n-gram 
models to cover rare n-gram cases. These variations are described in the equations below.  





               (1) 
  
   







                       (2) 




Probability of unseen =	;<=>?@	AB	CD*?*	(C1)
;<=>?@	AB	CD*?*	(C0)
                                (3) 
  ( 𝑐$ denotes the number of n-gram sequence where frequency is k.) 
  
For the exclusion policy for short gestures, we propose three options: training on all gestures; training 
on all except for single stroke gestures and; training on all except for dual and single stroke gestures. 
These variations seek to avoid cases where extremely short gestures in the training set have their 
probabilities overweight, potentially biasing the resulting n-gram models. Those parameters produce a 
total of 270 models (30 (discretizations) by 3 (smoothing methods) by 3 (exclusion policies)). Each 
model is normalized with an end symbol to ensure probabilities of all possible gesture passwords sums 
up to 1 [32]. Specifically, an “end symbol” is appended to password “	𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3	. . . 𝑎$” where the last 
transition probability of maximal allowed length password 	𝑃(𝑎$|𝑎IDJ	K?;) is 1. Specifically, we can 
achieve this by setting transitional probability of 𝑃(𝑎?|𝑎=) to 1, where 𝑎? denotes the “end symbol” 
and m denotes the maximum observed password length in a data set. 
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Normalized probability of password “𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3	. . . 𝑎$”: 
𝑃(𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3	. . . 𝑎$) 	= 	𝑃(𝑎1|𝑎*)𝑃(𝑎2|𝑎1)𝑃(𝑎3|𝑎2)	. . . 𝑃(𝑎$|𝑎$+1)𝑃(𝑎?|𝑎$) 
 
Finally, three criteria are compared to select the most appropriate model; crack rate (CR), similarity 
(SR), and completeness (CP). Crack rate was intended to represent the accuracy of the probability 
distribution of collected gesture samples in the model. We calculate it by generating dictionaries 
containing the the top k gestures (i.e., those achieving the highest probability) from the train sets for 
each model. We then reconstitute a stroke representation of each dictionary gesture using an arbitrary 
starting coordinate and concatenating together sub-strokes (one per symbol) using the central values of 
the appropriate length/angle segment – see step 6 and 7 in figure 3. With these dictionary gestures, we 
determine how many gestures in the test set are matched a given threshold t. The number of cracked 
gestures is then divided by the total number of gestures to calculate the crack rate. The second criteria 
is similarity between each users’ entered gesture and representation reconstituted from each n-gram 
model. The assumption behind similarity is that a close match to an original real-world gesture reflects 
a more accurate model. We use DTW distance to calculate similarity. The third criteria attempt to reflect 
how complete a model is, surmising that models in which we observe a larger proportion of possible n-
gram cases will be more accurate. This can be calculated by dividing the number of seen n-gram cases 
by the total number of possible n-gram cases. After calculating these metrics for all models, the most 
appropriate three models over all three criteria are then selected through manual inspection. 
 
 
Fig 3. Overview of discretization process from a gesture (step1) to angle-region symbols for building n-gram Markov models 
(step 5) and the gesture reconstitution process for evaluating them (step 6 and 7). Illustration uses a simple model with 2 length 
and 4 angle discretization regions. 
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To further improve performance of the three n-gram Markov models selected from previous criteria, 
edge cases in discretization stage need be considered. Specifically, cases where strokes lie on or near 
the boundaries between regions may be miscategorized or the reliability of the categorization may be 
low. To deal with this, we propose an approach where all strokes that lie within b% of length or angle 
boundary edges result in increasing the n-gram sequence frequency of both the actual and adjacent 
length or angle region by i and j respectively, where the sum of these values is always 1. To instantiate 
this idea, we apply it to each of the models selected in the previous stage and perform a grid search over 
all values of b in the range 1% to 10% for angle and length with both i and j set to a constant 0.5. This 
generates an additional 100 models for each base model studied. One or more reasonable models is 
selected based on balanced improvements to metrics defined above. 
With the selected n-gram Markov models, we calculated partial guessing entropy to evaluate the 
security of the gesture passwords [7]. Partial guessing entropy estimates are useful because real-world 
attackers might only be interested in cracking just a fraction of an entire password set - it is a popular 
technique for estimating the average number of trials needed to successfully crack a fraction (α) of an 
entire password set. We report these data in terms of “bits of information.” To calculate this, first we 
calculate probabilities of all possible passwords generated by the selected optimized n-gram Markov 
models and order them in non-increasing way. We can derive rank index 𝜇M (0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1) which is 
defined as index j where sum of probabilities ∑ 𝑝,
R
,S1  achieves 𝛼. Noting actual covered fraction as 
𝜆M = ∑ 𝑝,
UV
,S1 	 , we derive partial guessing entropy with following equation (1) and representation in 
terms of bits follows equation (2) [8]. 
  
Partial Guessing Entropy 𝛼= (1− 𝜆UV) × 𝜇M + ∑ (𝑝, × 𝑖)
UV




          Bits of Information 𝛼 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2×𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦	𝛼𝜆𝜇𝛼
− 1) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔( 12−𝜆𝜇𝛼








3.1.3 Dictionary assessment 
We create an effective clustering-based gesture dictionary that can be used as another security 
assessment. We derive gesture dictionary with following steps. Firstly, to create gesture dictionary 
composed of common shapes, similarities between all gestures in the training set are calculated using a 
gesture distance metric. Affinity propagation clustering algorithm is then applied to the similarities [36]. 
It is an exemplar-based clustering algorithm that identifies typical examples within the data set. When 
clusters composed of similar gestures results from affinity propagation algorithm, we select the 
geometric centers of each cluster as dictionary which are optimal representative gesture from derived 
cluster. We are interested in online attack scenario, where an attacker can try a limited number of 
guesses to crack a genuine user’s password. Specifically, with the dictionary of 20 center gestures, we 
match all test set gestures against the dictionary to calculate crack rate. The crack rate is the proportion 
of gestures in the test set that match at least one gesture in the dictionary. We report crack rates for a 














3.2 User study 
We capture large gesture data set and analyze based on two security evaluations described in 3.1. The 
gestures were captured in a homogeneous study protocol and outside traditional lab or university 
environments. The ethical aspects of the study were approved by the host university IRB. 
  
3.2.1 Gesture recognizer 
To capture data for both studies, we should use a gesture recognizer to accept, reject or confirm gestures. 
We use Protractor which is often deployed in many related gesture studies [3][18]. 
3.2.2 Study design 
We recruited experiment participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and implemented the 
study online. The study requires online users to participate in experiment on their mobile phones by 
providing them with a link or QR code to the study site. Those who try to participate with other type of 
device (e.g., a PC) were screen out and re-provided with link and QR code for use with a mobile device. 
When users start study clicking link or accessing QR code, they start with study instruction screen. It 
requests the users to create secure gesture password and incentive is provided to encourage him/her to 
create secure and memorable gesture password. In the next screen, they are requested to fill basic 
demographic information which is handedness, age, education level, occupation and ethnicity. 
After answering demographic survey, they are asked to create and then confirm their gesture passwords 
in a square canvas in the smartphone screen. The input canvas is designed in a way that the majority of 
users can reach with their thumb. For confirmation process, they have to enter chosen gesture again to 
verify their decision. If they fail to match their gestures in this stage, they have to start again from initial 
stage of creating gesture password. At any stage, participants can cancel and start from the creation 
again.  
Participants are requested for creating and confirming attack gesture to guess others’ gestures in the 
next step. The attack entry is designed to distract users’ working memory to recall gestures. For the 
final step, they finish the study by recalling creation gestures within 5 attempts. 
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                        (a)   Create                                (b)   Match                                (c) No Match 
Fig 4. The figure illustrates example screens of the first study running on smartphone. Gestures are created in limited input 
region in (a), matched in confirmation stage as (b), and fail to match in (c). 
 
3.2.3 Participants 
In total, 2619 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers completed the study, each rewarded with 0.25 USD. 
25 participants who were thought to have multiple Amazon accounts were removed from the set as they 
created essentially identical (and highly unique) gestures in close temporal proximity. The final gesture 
set contains data from 2594 MTurk workers. 
3.2.4 Results 
Usability 
Demographics: The majority of participants identified as white (56.32%), Asian (18.47%), Hispanic 
(9.48%) or black / African American (7.94%) and fell in the 18-24 (31.8%), 25-34 (46.72%) or 35-44 
(15.42%) age groups. Most were educated post-graduate (13.61%), college (49.46%) or high school 




Table 1. The table summarized usability results of the first study in terms of mean (𝜇), standard deviation(𝜎) and 
median(𝜇). (SC = Setup Cancel (#), CF = Count Match Failures (#), ST = Setup Time (s), RT = Recall Time (s)) 
 
Setup: We log the number of intentional cancellations of gesture set up (Setup Cancel), the time to 
create and confirm gestures (Setup Time), the number of failures to match creation gestures (Count 
Match Failures) by a user. These measures are summarized in terms of mean, standard deviation, and 
median as the positive skews in the data (Table1). 
Recall:  We log the time to recall creation gestures (Recall Time, see Table 1) and the number of 
participants who failed to recall their gesture within five attempts (Recall Rate). The recall rate in the 
study was 92.1%. Our recall rate is lower than previously reported recall rate of 98.9% [18]. Attack 
gesture negatively affects recall rates of users as 68% of errors occur along with confirmation of 
participants’ attack gestures. These participants mistakenly opted to enter their attack gestures rather 
than their creation gestures.  
Security                   
Partial guessing entropy: We follow the entropy analysis processes described in section 3.1.2. We 
create 270 different 2-gram models and applied selection criteria to choose a subset of models for 
optimization. We used DTW to calculate these metrics due to this algorithm’s improved performance 
over Protractor in terms of EERs (See figure 7) and set the threshold to the value corresponding to DTW 
10% FRR. Based on three decision parameters (CR, SR, and CP), we select the best three models to 
optimize for boundary. Table 2 presents the three best performing n-gram Markov after the optimization 
process. Although the first model “2X10” achieves the highest CR, it shows weakness on SR and “4X12” 
model shows weakness on CP, suggesting the 3X10 model may be the most reasonable choice. In 
addition to this result, we examine the distribution of frequencies for start, center and end strokes in 
these models (figure 5). General user behavior that can be assessed here is that their initial strokes tend 
to be rightward, central strokes tend to be short and curved, and final strokes are somewhat longer, but 
otherwise fairly evenly distributed. Thus, we believe that the model based on discretization into three 
length and ten angle regions (3x10) provides a well-balanced combination of high crack rate, close 
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accuracy to the original user-chosen gestures and high proportion of observed n-gram cases. We note 
that the model based on discretization into two length and ten angle regions (2x10) may perform better 
in terms of crack rate when gestures in a set are relatively simple. 
 
Table 2. Three selected n-gram models after optimization showing crack rate (CR), similarity (SR), and completeness (CP) 
metrics. 
We then calculated partial guessing entropy for the three optimized models, 4-digit PINs [2], and screen 
lock patterns [8]. This enables comparison across various password data sets. The results are presented 
in Table 3. Selecting optimal n-gram Markov model based on partial guessing entropy is not desirable 
as more complex model (4X12) tends to have higher partial guessing entropy values while showing 
poor model completeness. All three n-gram Markov models have higher partial guessing entropy values 
than PINs and patterns for every level of 𝛼. An interesting result is that partial guessing entropy values 
of the three n-gram Markov models show steep increase between 𝛼 levels of 0.1 to 0.4. This suggests 










Fig 5. Distribution of strokes in optimized 2x10 (top row), 3x10 (center row) and 4x12 (bottom row) n-gram models in the 
first study. Left column shows data from start strokes, right column shows data from final strokes and all other strokes are 
shown in the center column. Each figure is divided into the discretization regions available in the given n-gram model, with 
the frequency of sub-strokes observed in each region marked in % and by color. Boundary regions are shown to scale as grey 
areas for both length and angle. The proportion of strokes used in each region (black text) and boundary (grey text) is shown 




Clustering-based dictionary attack: For the next security assessment, we apply clustering-based 
dictionary attack to the gesture set to evaluate the set on crack rate metric.  Following steps stated in 
Section 3.1.3, we generate dictionaries for both Protractor and DTW distances. We set the dictionary 
size k as 20, assuming an online attacker with 20 guesses. The top 20 dictionaries for Protractor and 
DTW are shown in Figure 6. On a continuum of EER threshold values, the clustering-based dictionary 
shows high effectiveness - see Figure 8. Dictionaries crack between 54.18% (DTW) and 58.37% 
(Protractor) of gestures at EER derived threshold of, respectively, 4.14% and 3.59% FRR. The DTW 
recognition metric outperforms Protractor in terms of both crack rate and EER value. We compare this 
result with dictionary attacks performed on other password data set. For patterns, they crack 13.33% of 
passwords in real-world settings [37], 32.55% in Mturk study [8].  
Compared to this result with offline attack, recent gesture password work by Liu et al [6] cracks 55.9% 
of gestures with DTW recognizer with guesses. This can be explained in diverse aspects. 1) The 
previous study collects gestures in more controlled and strict settings leading participants to create more 
complex and diverse gestures than MTurk workers [38]. 2) Our work also constrains users to create 
single stroke gestures on a small-sized input canvas which possibly leads users toward simpler gestures 
than gestures in multi-stroke and large input size settings [5][6]. Nonetheless, the result is meaningful 
to highlight the vulnerability of gesture passwords due to the high proportion of “weak subspace” 
gestures composed of simple, similar or otherwise weak strokes [6]. 
  
 
                    (a) Protractor Dictionary                                                        (b) DTW Dictionary 




Fig 7. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves contrasting relative FRR and FAR performance for Protractor and 
DTW recognizers. The Protractor EER is 4.14% (AUROC: 0.974) at a threshold value of 1.25 and the DTW EER is 3.59% 




Fig 8. Proportion of cracked gestures with dictionaries at FRRs from 0%- 15% with Protractor and DTW recognizers in the 







IV. METER ONLINE USER STUDY 
  
From the first study, we observe that a large proportion of gestures can be cracked with a dictionary 
attack despite high entropy. To guide online users creating more secure gesture passwords, we design 
password meter policy for gestures in following section. The most important feature to design a 
password meter is a system that can provide a valid assessment of a given password’s strength [25]. To 
meet this condition, gesture password scoring techniques including four metrics are explored. We also 
test four compliance policies encouraging users to create more secure gesture passwords. Besides the 
strength evaluation, it is essential to provide appropriate feedback about their password security to 
encourage users toward more secure passwords. Hence, we also cover visual design elements (e.g. 
colors, texts, and bars) for the gesture meter. Finally, we perform another MTurk study (albeit small 
scale) to evaluate security and usability of the gestures created using the meter and compliance policies.  
  
4.1. Scoring mechanisms 
 
4.1.1 Password scoring 
Traditionally, the simplest metrics used for assessing password security is length and number of 
symbols in a password [10]. These are attractive security measures because they are simple to calculate 
and evaluate. However, it is hard to evaluate security solely on length and symbol numbers of a 
password [26][27]. For example, a zig-zag shaped gesture tends to have a long password length, 
although it is a very common shape that many users propose. A round shape has a lot of symbols 
(curvature produces lot of symbols in our discretization process) while it may also be, in practice, a 
very common choice. Thus, simple heuristics (password length and symbol number) need be combined 
with advanced metrics, n-gram Markov gesture probability and dictionary match score, to assess the 
genuine strength of a gesture [25]. n-gram Markov model has been known for its effectiveness of 
assessing password guessability in many security studies [9][28], and dictionary match score can work 
as quantitative dictionary metric which prevents users from selecting easy-to-guess passwords. To 
create these scoring metrics, the large gesture password dataset from the study outlined in section 3 was 
used to create automatic scoring approaches that can assess new gestures. We use this study data set as 
the basis for the meter for several reasons. Specifically, we argue using this set is appropriate because 
it has a 1) large sample number (N = 2594) and 2) the result of qualitative categorization reasonable 
follows other recent gesture studies [6] and 3) there are no public datasets containing gesture passwords.  
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Our basic scoring algorithm generates a rating for each gesture submitted to it. This is composed of 
several sub-metrics. We assign between 0 and 50 points for each of password length and number of 
symbols. For the Markov n-gram gesture probability and dictionary match score, we map percentile 
rank to the range between 0 to 100 points for each. Thus, the total score of a new gesture is between 0 
and 300 points. Each scoring metric is pre-identified and ordered from the large gesture data set to 
create percentile rank reference data. In this way, the system can easily refer the percentile rank for 
each metric when a new gesture enters the meter. We describe the sub-metrics in more detail below.  
  
4.1.2 Password length and symbol number 
Common and simple heuristics to estimate password strength are the password length and the number 
of symbols present in a password [10]. The notion behind those heuristics is that long and multi-symbol 
passwords are likely to be secure. A gesture needs to be composed set of symbols by following DP line 
simplification, sub-stroke division and discretization for length and angle as described in section 3.1.2. 
When a gesture is discretized with optimal discretization parameters (3×10), we can assess a password 
length and number of symbols by counting the number of total and non-overlapping symbols in a set of 
symbols. For instance, the password length for a password “a-b-b-c-c-d” is 6 and the number of symbols 
is 4. We calculate the scores for the two metrics by finding the percentile rank of relevant gesture from 
pre-collected large training set. We need to consider that the number of length and symbol of a 
discretized gesture actually relates to security measures. We perform simple linear regressions 
independently to check this relation. Specifically, we first calculate two metrics and apply unsupervised 
equal frequency binning to parse gestures into range of figures. We then perform a dictionary attack to 
binned gestures of each score metric with top 20 dictionaries derived from the study to get proportion 
of gestures cracked. Significant effects on crack rate are figured with password length (𝐹1,7= 734.4, 𝑝 <








4.1.3 Markov n-gram probability 
Evaluating probability of password is an effective strength estimation strategy as it reflects how it 
commonly occurs in the real world. Regression result verifies that probability is a valid measure of 
strength as it shows a strong linear relationship. (𝐹1,7= 618.6, 𝑝 < .0005, 𝑅2= 98.72) Although it is 
theoretically possible to access estimated password probability distribution with n-gram Markov models, 
it is often too costly regarding memory and time to consider the full possible gesture space as user 
anticipates immediate feedback from the system. To solve this, the probabilities for all gestures in pre-
collected large training set are calculated in advance by applying best performing n-gram Markov model 
derived from the first study, and the probabilities are ordered in non-decreasing way. When a user 
gesture is entered, it is initially discretized into symbols and n-gram probability is calculated with 
optimal n-gram Markov model. We then find the percentile rank of relevant gesture to generate the 
score for probability.  
 
 4.1.4 Dictionary match score 
In the previous study, we successfully guess a substantial amount of gestures using a clustering-based 
guessing attack. We believe the gesture dictionary derived from affinity clustering algorithm is effective 
from this security result. Thus, a gesture is assumed to be secure and unique if it is not similar to items 
in the dictionary. We take multi-stage approach to calculate dictionary match score. Firstly, we generate 
distance matrix with DTW matches from full-cluster and perform affinity propagation clustering 
method to separate groups composed of similar gestures, leading to 290 clusters with center. Secondly, 
we calculate a maximum distance score (the most similar) of entered gesture by matching the 290 
dictionary centers to obtain dictionary match score value. To derive percentile reference of dictionary 
match score, all distance scores are processed by matching all training set gestures to all dictionary 
gestures and the greatest distance is selected as the final match score. High dictionary match score of a 
gesture represents low maximum distances, implicating uniqueness of the relevant gesture. On the 
contrary, low dictionary match score of a gesture represents high maximum distances which imply 
similarity with the derived dictionary. When the maximum distance is higher than DTW 10% FRR level, 





4.2 Meter compliance policies 
One concern is whether the designed gesture meter motivates online workers to achieve high scores for 
their gesture [39]. From the previous study, we observe significant number of participants entered 
simple gestures as their password. This is an important issue for large scale online study that can pollute 
data quality. To avoid this kind of issue, one option to consider is setting minimum compliance, 
encouraging online users to create safer passwords [10]. Thus, four compliance policies are: 1) default 
meter and 2) weak, 3) fair, 4) strong compliances meter. While users can choose their gestures without 
any constraint for default policy, users are mandated to satisfy minimum scores of four ranges, these 
are 75, 150, and 225 points respectively for weak, fair and strong compliance policies (out of 300 points). 
Compliance policies force users to choose stronger gesture passwords (as measured by our meter). 
Nevertheless, this may irritate online users and cause an unwanted burden. Thus, the main goal under 
these compliances is to explore the tradeoff between usability and security of these policies so that the 
optimal compliance where two metrics balance can be established. 
  
4.3 Meter visuals 
  
4.3.1 Colored bar 
As the security of user-chosen passwords increases, the bar is filled accordingly. We follow the 
recommendations from recent string password meter study and use four colors [10]. The bar displays 
as red if it is filled between 0% to 25% implying user-chosen password is very weak regarding security, 
as orange from 25% to 50% which means user-chosen password is generally weak, as yellow from 50% 
to 75% as fair strength, and green meaning high strength of user-chosen passwords as the score reaches 
above 75%.   
4.3.2 Text 
General text feedback along with colored bars are designed to improve entered gesture password 
[10][22]. Overall rating text with color of a gesture password is displayed below the bar. In response to 
the total security score, a gesture password is categorized “Very Weak”, “Weak”, “Medium”, and 
“Strong” respectively if users achieve more than 0, 75, 150, and 225 out of 300 points. A consideration 
for text feedback is that users will fail to improve the password security unless they can understand how 
to improve their gestures. We solve this problem by displaying data-driven text feedback in addition to 
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the overall rating for each of three security metrics to assist users’ awareness. When a gesture is scored 
as “Strong”, we do not present text feedback for individual score metrics. We opt to choose general 
sentence for probability and match score metrics to provide understandable feedback for users. Three 
text feedbacks are designed for each metric regarding the score (maximum 100 points for each). 1) For 
password length and symbol, meter displays “It is very short” (0 to 25), “It is shorter than average” (25 
to 50), and “It is of average length” (50 to 75). 2) For password probability score, meter displays “It is 
very easy to guess” (0 to 25), “It is somewhat predictable” (25 to 50), and “It is somewhat unpredictable” 
(50 to 75). 3) For password match score, meter displays “It is often used by others” (0 to 25), “It is 
sometimes used by others” (25 to 50), “It is used by a few others” (50 to 75). See Figure 9 for example 
screens. 
 
   
        (a) Very Weak                      (b) Weak                                     (c) Fair                      (d) Strong 
Fig 9. Example gestures are displayed on a smartphone screen. The gestures are scored very weak, weak, fair, and strong in 
default compliance policy meter. (from left) Each gesture’s score is represented visually with colors (red, orange, yellow, and 
green) and lengths (short, middle short, middle long, and long) of score bar and text feedbacks for three score categories 









4.4. User study 
 
4.4.1 Study design 
We follow a similar process in the gesture meter study to the first study. We use MTurk to gather online 
participants and run the study online. Again, we only accept mobile device users by sending QRs or 
links. We use the same gesture recognizer, Protractor in the gesture meter study [3][18]. After 
presenting study instruction to create secure and memorable gesture password, we request demographic 
surveys to the participants. Then users move on to the gesture creation stage. In this stage, gesture score 
feedback section where users will be evaluated based on three predefined score metrics with colored 
bar and texts is newly added from the previous study. Users are forced to create their gesture again if 
the scores are barred from compliance policy when it’s mandated. Being satisfied with the choice and 
safe from gesture compliance policies, users click on next button to proceed confirmation. Users are 
asked to start creation again if they fail to match chosen gesture as in the first study, while they can 
cancel to start again at any stage of creation process. Due to negative effect on recall, we replace attack 
gesture creation session to memory game session used in previous work [8]. They also practiced their 
gesture 10 times and finally recall their creation gesture. Participants were invited (via email) to 
participate in a day-2 recall session 24 to 72 hours after completing the initial session. In that session, 
they were simply asked to recall their creation gesture one more time. Following the initial recall test, 







               (a) Create                                                   (b) Match                                         (c) No Match 
Fig 10. The figure illustrates example screens of the second study running on smartphone. Gestures are created with meter 
feedbacks in limited input region in (a), matched in confirmation stage as (b), and fail to match in (c). 
  
4.4.2 Participants 
In total 182, Amazon Mechanical Turk workers participate in the second study. 1 USD is rewarded for 
completing meter study which is increased from the first study as the new study involves new practice 
session and memory game. 
4.4.3 Results 
Usability 
Demographics: Most of the participants are Asian (66.5%), followed by white (28%) and Hispanic 
ethnic group (2.7%). Dominant age group is 25-34 (76.4%), 18-24 (12.6%) and 35-44 (8.8%). 
Educational level is mainly college (61%), post-graduate (33.5%) and their major was diverse. 
Setup Cancel, Setup time, Recall Time: Summary of usability statistics is summarized in table 4. As all 
usability measures show skewness in their data, we perform Kruskal-Wallis test over the measures. 
Significances are found in Setup Cancel (𝜒2 = 17.56, 𝑝 < 0.001), Setup Time (𝜒2 = 12.95, 𝑝 < 0.005) 
and Recall Time (𝜒2 = 8.58, 𝑝  < 0.05). We apply post-hoc Wilcoxon tests to these measures: 1) 
Significant differences are found in Setup Cancel between strong & default (𝑝 < 0.0005), between 
strong & weak (𝑝 < 0.005) and between fair & default (𝑝 < 0.05). Participants are less likely to change 
their passwords when strong compliance is given. 2) Significant differences are found in Setup Time 
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between strong & default (𝑝 < 0.005), between default & weak (𝑝 < 0.005) and  between strong & 
weak (𝑝 < 0.005) . Gesture setup time increases with stronger compliance policy. 3) Significant 
differences are found in Recall Time between fair & weak (𝑝 < 0.05)and between strong & weak (𝑝 <
0.01). Recall Time increases with stronger compliance policies. 
  
Table 4. The table summarized usability results of the second study in terms of mean (𝜇), standard deviation(𝜎) and 
median(𝜇). (SC = Setup Cancel (#), CF = Count Match Failures (#), ST = Setup Time (s), PM = Practice Match (#), RT = 
Recall Time (s), RA = Recall Attempts(#)) 
  
 
Recall: Day-1 Recall Rates are 93.18% for default meter, 96% for weak meter, 90.91% for fair meter, 
and 88.1% for strong meter. We compare these figures with recall rate of 98.9% from the prior study 
[18]. Fisher’s exact test results reveal significant differences in recall rates between 1) prior study and 
fair compliance meter and between 2) prior study and strong compliance meter (𝑝 < 0.05). We conclude 
that when we mandate compliance with stronger gesture ratings, usability is negatively influenced; 
Setup Time and Recall Time increase and Setup Cancels and Recall Rates decrease. 
Very small numbers of participants returned in day-2 recall session for all compliance policies: 6.82% 
returned in default, 19.2% in weak, 13.64% in fair, and 19.04% in strong. The low participation rate 
precludes reliable assessment of the usability in day-2 recall task. As a positive sign, we note that, 
overall, just two participants failed to recall their gestures - both with the weak compliance policy. 
Further work is needed to capture more data and provide a more meaningful characterization of gesture 





Partial guessing entropy: In the first study, we choose our best n-gram Markov model (length and angle  
divided into 3 and 10 regions respectively, offset phase alignment, add-1 smoothing, dual stroke 
exclusion, and boundary optimized 14% for length 18% for angle) on multiple criteria. We use this 
model to assess partial guessing entropy of gesture set collected from different compliance policies. 
Partial guessing entropy increase greatly from the first study. Over various portions (𝛼) of password 
default meter generally outperforms others. While strong password meter set reveals to have high partial 
guessing entropy at low alpha value (10%) which roughly equates online attack scenario, its strength 
decreases as fraction of password set increases. While the partial guessing entropy of weak password 
meter is poor at lower  (0.1, 0.2 and 0.3), it outperforms fair and strong meter at higher  (0.7 and 1.0). 
This result can be interpreted as the minority of users in weak meter policy create unique and hard to 
guess passwords that attackers are impossible to guess full set of passwords. In contrast, participants in 
fair and strong password meters are enforced to create complex gestures, reducing the size of weak 
subspace, increasing entropy at lower alpha.  
 
 
Table 5. The table summarizes partial guessing entropy results of the second study.  
 
Dictionary attack: We use full cluster top 20 dictionaries derived from the first study for online attack 
scenario. As we show the effectiveness of dictionary cracking large portion of gesture set, its 
effectiveness is tested across meter compliance policy designs. We use DTW as our recognition metric 
as it shows effectiveness over Protractor on EER and Crack rate in the first study. Security against 
online dictionary attack is increased from 11.92% to 60.45% (47.72% for default, 36.36% for fair, and 
21.43% for strong) compared previous result (54.18% of gesture cracked) except for weak compliance 
meter (59.62%) at system threshold FRR of 3.59%. We apply Fisher’s exact test to examine significant 
differences between the first study and compliance policies. Crack rates of weak and default compliance 
meters are not significantly different from the first study at system threshold (𝑝	> 0.1). We then examine 
crack rates at specific FRR rates 2.5%, 5% and 10% to see significant difference between compliance 
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policies. All comparisons show significant difference (𝑝	< 0.05) except for the following: 1) At 2.5% 
FRR rate, default compliance policy does not show any significant difference with weak compliance 
policy (𝑝	= 0.38) and between fair versus strong compliance policies (𝑝	= 0.89).  2) fair compliance 
policy also does not show significant difference at the 5% FRR with strong compliance policy  (𝑝	= 
0.051).  3) At 10% FRR, default compliance policy does not show significant difference with fair 
compliance policy (𝑝	= 0.17). We observe that weak compliance meter does not improve security of 
gestures, implying “weak subspace” [6] of this data set. This result complies with partial guessing 
analysis result that large proportion of gestures are actually simple and homogeneous. Security of 
default compliance meter improves in higher percentages of FRR which is not significantly different 
from fair compliance meter. fair compliance meter generally performs well on lower percentages FRR 
without any significant difference compared to the performance of strong compliance meter. 
 
 












5.1.1 Implications from the first study 
From the first study, we set multiple security assessments for gesture passwords and showed how a 
large proportion of users actually chose vulnerable gestures as their passwords against online guessing 
attack. However, limitations in this study exists: 1) representativeness of user-chosen gestures collected 
with online study [38] and 2) further discretization methods that can improve n-gram Markov models. 
To solve the proposed limitations, future work may focus on collecting real-world gesture passwords 
such as application usage setting and understanding further n-gram Markov model features that can 
improve both stroke discretization and representation.  
  
5.1.2 Selection of Password Meter  
To successfully increase security of gesture passwords, we proposed four password strength meters that 
vary minimum compliance policies. We observed security improved as users were given with more 
strict compliance policies, and that there was a usability cost to these changes, as indicated by prior 
studies [20].  
Weak compliance did not improve security where a user had to fill at least one fourth of the score bar 
policy. Online dictionary attack derived from the first study successfully guessed 59.62% of weak 
compliance gestures at system threshold and this feature was not significant different from the first 
study. Furthermore, partial guessing analysis also revealed these gestures have lower guessing entropy 
in small alpha values (𝛼< 0.4) than other compliance gesture sets. We conclude from these results that 
mandating minimum compliance does not improve security for gesture password strength meter.  
Although stronger compliances such as fair and strong policies significantly improved security - crack 
rates of 36.36% for fair, and 21.43% for strong - where users had to fill at least two fourths and three 
fourths respectively, it negatively impacted usability reducing recall rate 8% to 10% (𝑝< 0.05) with 
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increased set up & recall time (𝑝< 0.01). We note that mandating compliance more than half of the total 
range of score significantly affect usability despite advantages in security. 
We recommend the default policy over any compliance policy for the following reasons: 1) mere cost 
in usability - no significant difference in recall rate with prior rate of 98.9% (𝑝	> 0.05) shorter setup 
time compared to strong compliance policy (𝑝	< 0.005) and more engagement with high setup cancel 
over other compliance policies (𝑝	< 0.05),  2) improvement in security - higher partial guessing entropy 
over diverse 𝛼 values than compliance policies and no significant difference in crack rate in high FRR 
threshold values (FRR  > 8.27%) with a stronger compliance policy (𝑝 > 0.05).  
 
5.1.3 Gesture samples of the second study 
We observe a major difference in demographics between the first and the second study. Most of the 
participants were white (56.32%) followed by Asian (18.47%) in the first study, while the majority of 
participants were Asian (66.5%) followed by white (28%) in the second study. We need to collect more 
comparable data set for the second study with larger sample numbers to minimize the impact of this 
difference in future studies. 
Because of reduced number of samples in the second study, limitations in security and usability analysis 
exist. We do not perform affinity propagation algorithm independently for each compliance policies in 
the security analysis. It is worth running the technique for the future work to explore how many clusters 
are generated with larger samples (n > 1000), what is general inter-cluster feature and how cluster 
centers appear. Another benefit of running a large scale meter study will be collecting reasonable 
amount of day-2 or week-1 performance data to further examine the usability of gestures.  
 
5.1.4 Design of password strength meter 
Although general bar and text feedback is applied identically over different compliance policies, visual 
factors will be considered in the future work as prior study [10] explored diverse condition of designs 
to optimize the best performing model. Moreover, it is intriguing to figure out whether interaction 
effects exist between compliance conditions and diverse designs. In this way, we can further optimize 
our gesture meter. 
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5.1.5 Gesture implications 
Even though users typically chose simple and homogeneous gestures as their passwords in the first 
study, security improvement with application of password strength meter suggests user-chosen gesture 




We perform a large scale online study of gesture passwords. We propose a framework analyzing gesture 
password security and determine key vulnerabilities. We propose novel meter designs to improve 
gesture passwords by diversifying mandated compliances: default, weak, fair, and strong. While the 
weak compliance policy reduces security against online dictionary attack, fair and strong policies 
improve security with significant cost in usability. The default policy improves security to a similar 
level of the fair compliance policy with an acceptable cost in terms of usability. We conclude gesture 
passwords are a promising authentication technique for phone lock if supported by well-designed 
selection policies. We plan to perform a large-scale study of gesture password meters in the future.  
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Table 6. Subset of 134 n-gram Markov models generated from the first study achieving crack rates greater than 10%. Metrics of 
Crack Rate (CR), Similarity (SM), and Completeness (CP) are calculated for each model. Selected models for optimization are 
highlighted in bold. 
 
